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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF
WILLS, ESTATES AND TRUSTS
By

WILLIAM P.

CANTWELL*

1960 was a highly significant year in many important everyday
areas affecting Colorado lawyers and their clients involved with
wills, estates, trusts and inheritance taxes.
Problems with the mechanism of paying death taxes in estates
received attention in two cases. In Williams v. Stander1 the testatrix had made an intervivos transfer with a retained life interest,
which resulted in a taxable transfer for both state and federal purposes. Her will contained a rather usual type of clause fixing the
burden of death taxes payable "in respect to my said estate, or to
any devise, legacy or distribution under this Will, or otherwise" on
her probate estate, and directed her executors to pay such taxes as
an expense of administration. The Supreme Court rejected an assertion by the executors that the clause was insufficient to charge
the probate assets with death taxes on the assets transferred during
life subject to the retained interest, and held that the testatrix had
clearly fixed the burden of all taxes on the probate assets by the
use of the disjunctive phrase "or otherwise." The testatrix in Ramsey v. Nordloh2 chose to direct a different burden of taxes in her
will, providing that each legatee or devisee must pay the death tax
on benefits under the will, a scheme generally referred to as an "apportionment" of taxes. On an appeal from a county court determination that specific legatees were not required to contribute to
federal estate taxes, the Supreme Court reversed. It held that the
language of the tax-burden clause used, which referred to "inheritance, estate or succession taxes" was referring to the federal estate
tax, and that the word "federal" was not necessary to sweep the
burden of the federal estate tax within the direction of the clause.
It also held that, apportionment having been directed, this meant
the doctrine of equitable apportionment of the federal estate tax,
and that ". . . each beneficiary must pay that part of the tax that
their respective bequests bear to the net amount of the estate upon
which the tax is calculated. ' '13 In an important dictum the court referred to the general rule on the burden of the federal estate tax in
the absence of a statute as providing that specific legacies are paid
without this deduction being made from them. Because Colorado
has no statute it may be presumed that this would have been the
court's determination in the absence of the clause in question, since
it pinned its decision squarely on the adequacy and intent of the
clause to alter the general rule, holding that it did so.
In another case 4 a fiduciary ran into serious difficulties with
another federal tax-the income tax. The executor and principal
beneficiary had settled a caveat in 1951 and closed the estate in
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1953. Before death in 1950 the Internal Revenue Service had begun
investigating decedent's income tax returns, and finally made an
assessment in 1955 which was settled at the Tax Court level in 1956.
The executor paid the deficiency and demanded reimbursement of
half the amount from the defendant, who had been the caveatrix.
The claim was that she was liable as a transferee, but in affirming
the trial court's holding for the defendant the Supreme Court pointed out that transferee liability was secondary, and that primary liability fell on the estate. Since there had been a distribution of assets by the plaintiff-executor without providing for the tax liability
of which he had knowledge, he was personally liable for the payment of the estate's obligation because of his wrongful over-distribution and was without a right of contribution as against the caveatrix-defendant.
The rule against perpetuities received attention in Colorado
Nat'l Bank v. McCabe.5 Testatrix had created interests in a trust
with a term in gross of twenty-five years. One of the beneficiaries
of the trust, who was not an heir, instituted a proceeding in the
county court asking for a construction of the will. The county court
held the trust to be invalid and decreed that the residuary estate
should be distributed to the three living residuary beneficiaries, who
were designated in the will as both income beneficiaries and remaindermen of the trust if living at the expiration of its term. A
contingent remainder in favor of charities was also created. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the interest of the three living income beneficiaries, in income, was vested, and therefore without the rule; that while their interests in principal were contingent
and required survivorship of the term in gross, they were nevertheless valid since they would have to vest, if at all, within the period
of the lives of the beneficiaries, who were in being at testatrix'
death. The other interests, being a contingent remainder in favor
of issue of the income beneficiaries, and an ultimate contingent remainder in favor of charities, were stricken as being remote. In default of survivorship of the term in gross by the income beneficiaries, the decedent's heirs would take. A collateral issue involved an
in terrorem clause which purportedly defeated the interest of anyone who should ". . . directly or indirectly contest or aid in contesting the [will] . . . or any of the provisions thereof or the distribu-

tion of my estate thereunder." Without pronouncing the validity or
invalidity of such clauses in general, the court held that it did not
affect the right of the petitioner (a beneficiary) in the particular
case, since the petition was made with probable cause after a failure
of the fiduciary to take action, and resulted in no benefit to the
petitioner.
A "do-it-yourself" will was involved in Ambrose v. Singleton.6
A construction proceeding followed. Specific devises were involved,
and the realty was subject to encumbrances at decedent's death.
The devisees contended the will showed an intent to exonerate the
realty from the liens and were successful in the county and district
courts against the executor's contrary contention. The Supreme
Court carefully reviewed its decision in its first holding on the
5 353 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1960).
6 356 P.2d 253 (Colo. 1960).
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problem of exoneration7 and clearly stated that the common law
doctrine of exoneration was not the law in Colorado and that there
would be no exoneration in Colorado without an affirmative showing of intent to exonerate in the will itself. Since it found that the
will showed no such intent, the holdings below were reversed and
the devisees were held to take subject to the burden of the encumbrances.
The important problem of the integration of two testamentary
instruments as the single will of the testator received attention in
Lehmer v. Lehmer.8 Decedent left two wills, one dated March 28,
1957 and the second dated May 8, 1957. In a proceeding in which
both wills were offered, the county court admitted the earlier will
and denied probate to the later one. On appeal to the district court
it was held that both wills had been executed in accordance with
proper statutory procedures. On appeal to the Supreme Court it
was held that there was no inconsistency between the two documents, and since the later will did not revoke the prior will, both
could be admitted to probate. Under these circumstances there was
not even a partial revocation by inconsistency and both wills could
be construed together as a single instrument. Remand followed the
holding with instructions to so treat the wills.
Estate of Varnum9 involved a "lost will" and an attempt to probate it under CRS '53, §152-5-29. The evidence was particularly
equivocal on the matter of the contents of the purported lost will,
and the Supreme Court reversed a county court holding admitting
the will to probate. While there is language in the opinion that
might possibly be held to impair the discussion in the leading case
of Eder v. Methodist Ass'n10 on the meaning of the requirement that
the will must be "in existence" at the death of the testator, a careful reading of both cases, together with the court's reference to the
Eder case in the Varnum decision, appears to leave the earlier holding on the point intact. That was to the effect that the term "in
existence" did not require physical existence but only conceptual
existence as the unrevoked will of a testator of which the physical
evidence had been lost.
7 Robinson'v. Tubbs, 140 Colo. 471, 344 P.2d 1080 (1959).
9 357 P.2d 89 (Colo. 1960).
9 357 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1960).
10 94 Colo. 173, 29 P.2d 631 (1934).
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A number of other cases also reached the court which dealt with
some of the perennial problems in the field. Thomas v. Davis11 was
an undue influence case holding for the caveatrix which held the
"dead man statute"'12 to be no bar to testimony of beneficiary-witnesses called by an adverse party who testified against their own13
interests. Claims procedure was involved in three cases. In one
an administratrix instituted a suit in the district court to collect a
debt but was met by an offsetting claim of a very nearly equal
amount. The claim against the estate had been dismissed in county
court for late filing, but it was allowed as an offset in the district
court on the ground that the decedent could not have recovered
more had he lived and that this placed a limit on what his administratrix could recover. The second claims case 14 involved the 1959
amendment to the claims statute 15 permitting claims to be tried
under the rules of civil procedure. The Supreme Court held that the
county court had invoked the framework of the rules, and that for
this reason, defenses of laches and the statute of limitations could
not be raised by a motion to dismiss, so that the cause was remanded for trial on the merits. The third case 6 adds a new and highly
important facet to the heavily litigated problem of the tort claim
against a decedent. 17 A district court action and a county court
claim were filed against the estate of a decedent on the same day.
The county court claim was dismissed for late filing. Appeal was
from a district court dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. This was reversed in the Supreme Court, with a holding that there was concurrent jurisdiction, and since the county court dismissal was not
on the merits, the district court had full power to adjudicate the
plaintiff's claim. In its opinion the court squarely faced the issue of
whether the county court'has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine surviving tort actions against estates and its holding appears to be a clear repudiation of any idea that it does. The opinion
limits the requirement of the survival statute' that a claim be filed
in the decedent's estate to be exclusively enforceable against the
estate as a claim to cases in which an action has actually been instituted before death, and not to other cases, such as accident cases
in which the alleged tort-feasor is himself killed. Unfortunately,
the case does not reach the problem of how a judgment can be collected, since no timely contingent claim was on file in the estate
proceeding. While a judgment might be collected from after-dis,
covered and after-inventoried assets, the case leaves uncertain the
problem of collection in the absence of such assets.
A legal life estate with full power of disposition was enlarged
to a fee in Zell v. Zell' 9 in accordance with earlier case law. 20 Conflicting escheat claims of the federal and state governments to the
11

356 P.2d 963 (Colo. 196").
12 Colo. Rev. Stat. §153-1-1 (1953).
13 Dash v. Rubey, 357 P.2d 81 (Colo. 1960).
14 McPherson v. McPherson, 358 P.2d 479 (Colo. 1960).
15 Colo. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 290, §1.
16 Ohmie v. Martinez, 349 P.2d 131 (Colo. 1960).
17 Meyers v. Williams, 137 Colo. 325, 324 P.2d 788 (1958); Film Enterprises a. Wolfberg, 137 Colo.
84, 321 P.2d 218 (1958); Weller v. Bank of Vernal, 137 Colo. 32, 321 P.2d 216 (1958); Koon a. Barmettler, 134 Colo. 221, 301 P.2d 713 (1956).
18 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 152-1-9 (Supp.

1957).

10351 P.2d 272 (Colo. 1960).
20 Cf., Davey v. Weber, 133 Colo. 365, 295 P.2d 688 (1956) and McLaughlin v. Collins, 109 Colo.
377, 125 P.2d 633 (1942).
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estate of a deceased veteran were litigated in Estate of Plich,21 with
the issue going in favor of the United States on a narrow issue of
statutory construction. The effect of a broad grant of administrative powers as exempting an executor from statutory duties was
also passed on by the court in a case involving an individual fiduciary to whose final report objections were made.2 2 The court found
no exemption from such statutory obligations and remanded the
case with extremely explicit instructions as to what was required
from the fiduciary in reporting his activities. In First Nat'l Bank
v. Honstein23 a parent-child transaction was involved. Parent's estate claimed a resulting trust and the son claimed a completed gift.
After examining the facts the Supreme Court was satisfied that a
completed gift had been made and affirmed the judgment of the
district court.
The standing of a guardian ad litem to appeal a determination
of heirship was the issue in Miller v. Clark.2 4 The Supreme Court
held that the county court's determination of heirship had ended
the guardian's appointment and that he had no standing to appeal,
particularly in view of the county court's denial of his petition for
permission to appeal. Relative jurisdiction of the county and district courts was involved in Burch v. Burch25 which concerned an
accounting between a decedent and a survivor who conducted a
business under an agreement. The Supreme Court held that the
district court could grant complete relief since more than the estate's interest in the business was involved.
A series of important and interesting inheritance tax cases also
occurred during the year. In People v. Fester26 a joint bank account
was involved, with the inheritance tax commissioner seeking to tax
the asset under the letter of the statute while meeting an argument
that the form of the transaction was not its substance. The issue
was whether the form of the account rendered the transaction a
"transfer" to the surviving joint tenant, a stranger, and thus taxable, or whether an oral trust under which the account was created,
and which was in fact performed by the surviving joint tenant by
a transfer to the trust beneficiary, a son, rendered the transaction
as a transfer to him and thus within his exemption. The Supreme
Court held for the taxpayer, pointing out that in such cases ".. . it is
proper to show the intention of the parties in creating the joint
tenancy . . .,"27 and rejected the point urged by the commissioner,
which was that record title, and record title alone, should fix the
incidence of the tax. In framing its own version of the perennial
form against substance issue in tax litigation the court stated flatly:
"The fiction of'' 28record title here must fall before the onslaught of
the true facts.
Two cases involving optional valuation questions 29 both resulted in reversals of the lower court holdings favoring the tax-payers.
21 348 P.2d 706 (Colo. 1960).
22 Irwin v. Robinson, 355 P.2d 108 (Colo. 1960).
23 355 P.2d 535 (Colo. 1960).
24 356 P.2d 965 (Colo. 1960).
25 358 P.2d 1011 (Colo. 1960).
26 356 P.2d 130 (Colo. 1960).
27 Id. at 132.
28 Ibid.
29 People v. First Nat'l Bank, 356 P.2d 967 (Colo.
(Colo. 1960).

1960) and People v. Sweet,

356 P.2d 883
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In the cases there were equivocal facts surrounding the election of
optional valuation and the court held the taxpayers to a duty of
strict compliance with the statute. In one case no election at all had
been filed within the thirteen month period, and in the other there
had been a mere reservation of right to elect, which the court held
to be no election. It is worth noting that an amendment to the statute30 has altered the law under which these cases arose.
In the fourth inheritance tax case, People v. Mason,3 1 a long
opinion and a dissent dealt with a difficult and ominous problem.
The decedent had been indebted to the Fort Collins Production Association in the sum of $58,092.64, but was insured in favor of the
Association under a creditor's group life insurance policy in the sum
of $10,000.00. Had there been an excess of insurance proceeds over
the debt, the excess would have been paid to the decedent's estate
or certain alternate beneficiaries, at the option of the creditor. The
court dealt with the problem of the indirect benefit to the estate
from such a policy, and held that a policy which reduced an estate's
obligation, even though indirectly, was not exempt under the statute 32 since it was thereby "payable in such manner as to be subject to the claims against his estate." The court also dealt with the
taxpayer's argument that possession of "incidents of ownership" was
the sole test of taxability of the particular policy, determining that
this was but one of two tests which might be applied, the other be30 Colo. Sess. Laws 1959, ch,. 260, § 1.
31 356 P.2d 257 (Colo. 1960),
32 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 138-4-9 (1953).
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ing the availability of the insurance proceeds to pay claims or for
distribution as part of the estate. In its determination the court
noted that the proceeds were indirectly subject to distribution as a
part of the estate because they freed equivalent assets of the estate
that would otherwise have been required to discharge the debt. The
majority opinion was met by an exceptionally vigorous dissent
which took the majority's position to its extreme and pointed out
that it would sweep within the tax all types of third party benefits,
indeminities and payments which served to reduce claims against
the estate, so that all such payments, not heretofore considered taxable, would be taxable. Listed were such benefits as Blue Cross and
Blue Shield payments, veteran's burial benefits, fraternal benefits
payable for funeral expenses, prepaid funeral contracts and the like.
The dissent would have treated the contract as true life insurance
payable to a named beneficiary and thus within the exemption
without regard to a debtor-creditor relationship between the beneficiary and the insured. The dissent pointed out the near-impossibility of earmarking any insurance for debts, and went on to raise
questions concerning insurance collateralized to pay debts and loans
from insurance companies, as well as pointing out that the opinion
clearly renders taxable bank and loan company insurance on the
lives of borrowers.
In many estates life insurance is a major asset. Where this is
true, the estates are generally not large, and this factor makes legitimate tax saving even more crucial. At the same time the majority
of persons have no wish to avoid proper claims for their debts. To
render such insurance proceeds available to pay such debts and to
qualify them for the life insurance exemption now seems virtually
impossible. Where there are assets in a probate estate which can be
bought by a life insurance trust, or against the security of which
the trustees may loan insurance proceeds, a feasible way forward
may exist. But where no such assets exist, or where there is virtually no probate estate and a relatively large life insurance trust, the
problem becomes difficult, if not impossible, to solve. Moreover, the
logic of the majority opinion might even extend to the voluntary
payment by a named lump-sum beneficiary of the deceased's debts.
This, too, enriches the estate and thus constitutes an indirect distribution of such payments as a "part of the estate." If this is what
the statute means, a great deal of life insurance sold to make assets available to "pay debts and inheritance taxes" may well be
taxable for Colorado inheritance tax purposes, even though few
persons have thought so until now.
It has been many years since such a volume of cases has been
decided in the field. It may be a sign of increased activity by the
bar in analyzing problems or of increased interest in settling some
pf the many questions in the area not previously determined by the
court. In particular the federal and state tax questions indicate increased awareness of the impact of taxes on more traditional matters. Yet, when these matters are open for determination at the
time of administration, they frequently indicate that the planning
job was unfinished and hence heighten the challenge to the bar in
rendering service at that stage.
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